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MATHEMATICAL EXISTENCE DE-PLATONIZED:
INTRODUCING OBJECTS OF SUPPOSITION
IN THE ARTS AND SCIENCES
ROBERT A. RYNASIEWICZ, SHANE STEINERT-THRELKELD, VIVEK SURI
Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a suppositional view of linguistic practice
that ranges over fiction, science, and mathematics. While having similar con-
sequences to some other views, in particular Linsky and Zalta’s plenitudinous
platonism, the view advocated here both differs fundamentally in approach and
accounts for a wider range of phenomena and scientific discourse.
1. Introduction
Philosophers of mathematics frequently quarrel over whether entities such as the
natural numbers of Peano arithmetic (P) or the sets of Zermelo-Frankel set the-
ory (ZF) [really] exist. Such entities are distinguished by the feature that they are
invariant under the automorphisms of the intended models of those systems. Indeed,
the intended models have no non-trivial automorphisms. Hardly ever is it discussed
whether the entities of, say, Euclidean geometry, exist or in general, of systems whose
models have non-trivial automorphisms.
The issue is this. Platonists, who maintain that numbers and sets exist, typically
impose as a criterion of individuation on such abstract objects a version of Leib-
niz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles: if x and y share all the same formal1
properties, then x = y. This principle is clearly satisfied by a structure whose only
automorphism is the identity map. However, if the symmetry group of a mathe-
matical structure contains permutations of the domain of discourse other than the
identity map, the structure attributes to all points from the same orbit exactly the
same properties — else they could not be mapped to one another by one or another
member of the symmetry group. One of two conclusions appears to be forced. Either
the entities that populate the domain of discourse do not exist or else points from
the same orbit must be identified with one another. Clearly the latter will not do,
since for such mathematical structures as Euclidean space or Minkowski space-time
the domain of discourse then collapses to a singleton set. Thus, Platonists of this
stripe are saddled with a double standard. The points of some spaces of Riemannian
1The reason for this qualification will become apparent in what follows.
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geometry make it into their ontology, but not the points of other such spaces (say,
those of constant curvature).
This appears to be an artificially arbitrary ontology. We take it to be a sound
methodological constraint that no matter what one’s philosophical persuasion that
all mathematical entities be treated on a par unless there is some good reason internal
to mathematics to do otherwise. If it is held that the points of homogenous spaces
strictly speaking do not exist, we want at least a good explanation of why we are
ordinarily justified in speaking as if they do.
It may be objected that the Leibnizian principle is itself a good reason internal
to mathematics.2 In what follows, we trace how it happens in practice that indi-
vidual points from homogenous spaces typically enter into mathematical discourse
and explain the sense in which the above sort of Platonism is almost correct. In
doing so, though, we show how one can have most of what the Platonist wants while
remaining true to naturalism and without buying into metaphysical dogmas. The
account we give not only reveals connections with the realm of fictional entities, as
some Platonists have noticed, but also extends to the very heart of scientific theory
and discovery.
2. Some Other Constraints.
We take as our foil the position of “Platonized” naturalism due to Linsky and Zalta
(1995). But before setting out the details of their position, we would like to bring to
the forefront three consequences of their position that we believe that any adequate
philosophy of mathematics should entail. As will be seen, these are consequences of
the view we shall set out.
The first, that mathematical objects should have the formal properties they have
necessarily, may seem jejune, but takes on pizazz if it is noted that a view that
explains why this is so is preferable to a view that merely stipulates it is so. On our
view, mathematical objects necessarily have the formal properties they do in virtue
of what they are, otherwise we would not be able to refer to them.
The second constraint is the permissibility of truth value gaps. The status of
the continuum hypothesis or Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem are often cited as
principal reasons. We remind the reader of these, but emphasize the ultimate reason
is the nature of the game. No set theorist (or none that we are aware of) would insist
on the axiom of foundations. Take it if you like. But if you have a hankering for
what life is like with sets that are not well-founded, knock yourself out.
2Leibniz himself argued against absolute space as something real on the grounds of the indis-
cernibility of the parts of space but saw this as insufficient reason to reject space as something ideal .
See Leibniz (2000).
MATHEMATICAL EXISTENCE DE-PLATONIZED:INTRODUCING OBJECTS OF SUPPOSITIONIN THE ARTS AND SCIENCES3
The third (and final) constraint is that the identity of mathematical entities is
as fine-grained as can be. This takes some explaining. Any difference in conformal
properties indicates distinct mathematical entities. Under this requirement, the Be-
nacerraf question of ‘which ordinal is the real number 3?’ is a meaningless question.
The different objects that fit the bill of being the number 3 are in fact distinct math-
ematical objects because of the additional properties they carry. For instance, the
von Neumann ordinal satisfies 3 ∈ 4 while the Zermelo does not. Neither of these
constitutes a “true” conception of the number 3, but simply describes a property of
the respective ordinal.
3. “Platonized” Naturalism.
Meinong (1915) argued that, since there are things that don’t exist (the golden
mountain, Santa Claus), there is a difference between being and existence. For
any collection of properties, there is something that has just those properties. The
position on the face of it is inconsistent (see Parsons (1980)). Meinong’s student,
Mally (1912), observed that the inconsistency can be avoided if a distinction is also
drawn between two different ways in which something x can have a property F . On
the one hand, x may exemplify F , written Fx. This is the sense in which things
are normally said to have the properties they do. On the other, x might encode F ,
written xF . Meinong’s principle is then to be understood in terms of encoding. For
any collection of properties, there is something that encodes just those properties.3
What Linsky and Zalta call “Platonized naturalism” picks up on Mally’s hint
to salvage Meinong’s jungle. They add that objects that do not exist are abstract
objects and institute three principles governing them (we quote, Linsky and Zalta
1995, 536).
(1) For every condition on properties, there is an abstract individual that encodes
exactly the properties satisfying the condition.4
(2) If x possibly encodes a property F , it does so necessarily.5
(3) If x and y are abstract individuals, then they are identical if and only if they
encode the same properties.6
3Mally also observed that one could instead distinguish between two types of properties, nuclear
and extra-nuclear. Each property (as conceived pre-analytically) comes in both nuclear and extra-
nuclear form. Instead of encoding a property, an object exemplifies the nuclear form of the property.
Exemplifying a property is just exemplifying the extra-nuclear form. This option is developed in
Parsons (1980)
4Symbolically, ∃(A!x ∧ ∀F (xF ↔ φ)), where x is not free in φ and ‘A!’ is a predicate constant
whose intended interpretation is ‘is abstract’.
5♦xF → xF .
6A!x ∧A!y → (x = y ↔ ∀F (xF ↔ yF )).
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Thus, for Linsky and Zalta, the realm of abstract objects covers the entire water-
front, from creatures of myth and fiction, to intentional objects in general, to the
complete sequence of increasingly accurate decimal approximations of pi. The do-
main of mathematics is marked out by mathematical theories , which must satisfy
the “rule of closure” to the effect that they are closed under logical consequence.7,8
Technically, if p is a theorem of theory T , then T encodes the property being such that
p. If κ is a variable free term in the language of T , then there is an abstract object
κT that encodes exactly the properties that the theory states that κT exemplifies.
Going back to the three desiderata from the preceding section, it’s clear that it
follows from (2) that a mathematical object necessarily encodes the properties it
in fact encodes. But that seems to be the sole purpose of (2), so that the first
desideratum appears to be put in by hand.
The second desideratum follows simply from the fact that many mathematical
theories are incomplete in the usual sense that there are sentences such that neither
they nor their negations are theorems. Apart from the famous examples of P and
ZF, whose incompleteness derives from deep facts about diagonalization and the
representability of recursive arithmetic functions, there are mundane examples such
as group theory or the theory of vector spaces formulated in first-order languages
that do not intend to describe a single structure up to isomorphism but instead an
entire category of structures.
The third desideratum is satisfied insofar as each mathematical entity is tied to a
unique mathematical theory, and, hence, distinct theories describe distinct mathe-
matical entities. For example, let N be the theory of the intended model of P . Since
N is complete while P is not, N and P are distinct theories. Hence, (0)N is subtly
distinct from (0)P .
Alas, it appears that the Linksy-Zalta theory’s virtues end there. In particular,
postulate (3), or more specifically the half that demands the identity of indiscernibly
encoded individuals, entails that there are no individuals populating homogenous
spaces. Since the only work this half of the principle appears to be doing is to cap
the ontology for fear that it becomes way over-bloated, it might be thought that the
problem of homogenous spaces can be solved just by jettisoning the requirement.
This, by itself, only removes the prohibition on the wanted individuals from existing
and leaves it completely undecided whether they exist or not. We take the difficulty
7Presumably, Linsky and Zalta take this to be classical, not intuitionistic logical consequence,
but do not elaborate whether they have in mind specifically first-order entailment or entailment in
a higher-order logic.
8The reader may wonder whether this is sufficient to demarcate mathematical objects from other
varieties of abstract objects. Is it never the case that what’s true according to a work of fiction is
closed under logical consequence? Our view accounts for the difference in terms of the principles at
work in what we call the interpretive engine responsible for generating the supposition in question.
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to be a symptom of a deeper problem, viz., the status of entities introduced by mere
supposition in the course of mathematical argumentation.
4. Objects of Supposition
The standard proof that
√
2 is irrational is a reductio ad absurdum on the suppo-
sition that that it is rational. Specifically, suppose that p and q are integers (with no
common divisors) such that p/q =
√
2. Then p2/q2 = 2. Hence, p2, and in turn p,
must be even. Thus, p = 2r for some integer r and 4r2/q2 = 2, i.e., q2 = 2. So q as
well as p must be even, contradicting the assumption they have no common divisors.
What is the ontological status of p (respectively, q)? Whatever it is, it appears to
fit no traditional category. We have stipulated the existence of p and q as a matter of
supposition and have proceeded, throughout the proof, to speak of them as though
they are definite integers. Moreover, we may continue to speak of them coherently
outside the proof, as we have been doing. For lack of anything better, let us say that
their ontological status is one of existence-by-stipulation. As a matter of linguistic
practice we find ourselves able in the context of supposition to introduce new terms,
to use them as though they have a definite reference, and to ascribe properties to
them. Subsequently, outside the context of supposition, we are able to continue to
use the terms as though they are names for the objects introduced in the context of
the supposition.
Our emphasis, though, is not on ontology, but on the phenomenology of language
use, in particular, on the use of language in a clearly identifiable and pervasive
practice that is best described as the practice of supposition, as long as we are clear
that the term ‘supposition’ is not meant here to carry any epistemic import but only
the import of “suppose for argument’s sake” or “suppose just for the hell of it.”
We also caution that to suppose [something] is not just the same as to entertain a
proposition. For the act of supposing may involve the extension of our language by
the introduction of new terminology, as when the novelist pens a new name or the
scientist coins a new term for something merely hypothetical. The fabrication of the
supposition itself provides the guide for usage of the newly introduced terminology.
Some may find it irresistible to further assimilate objects of supposition to some
traditionally established metaphysical category. But we do not see anything inherent
in the phenomena that forces this upon us and will continue to speak of existence-
by-stipulation, not as some newly invented ontological category, but merely as a
descriptive place-holder for a phenomenal realm.
5. The Dynamics of Suppositional Practice
Although the use of supposition in mathematical proof provides a paradigm, the
practice of supposition pervades the use of language in many domains, as we have
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intimated above, including discourse about fictions, the use of idealizations in sci-
ence, and also the introduction of hypothetical entities in scientific theory. As a
general picture of the practice of supposition we see three components. Taking a
cue from Walton (1990), one begins with a prop — a picture, toy, statue, physical
model, segment of fictional text — to which is applied an interpretive engine from
which is generated a (perhaps fuzzy) set of sentences in some language, which may
contain previously uninterpreted terms. The resulting set of sentences is a represen-
tation of the corresponding supposition.9 Given the same prop, different interpretive
engines can (and typically will) yield distinct suppositions. In the case of fiction and
mimetic art, the supposition comprises just those sentences that may be said to be
true according to the story or according to what’s depicted by the work of art. In the
course of the generation of the supposition, the interpretive engine in general works
non-monotonically, using a blend of deductive, inductive, and interpretive principles
such as authorial intentionality. Suppositions need not be complete nor even neces-
sarily closed under logical consequence. In scientific practice, the prop may be a set
of phenomena to be explained, the interpretive engine rely on abductive inference,
and the resulting supposition include terms for newly introduced, purported entities
(hypothetical entities).
In discourse about an object of supposition outside the context of its generation,
it becomes necessary to distinguish between two patterns of predication. One is to
predicate in conformity with the supposition. Suppose a sentence of the form ϕ(τ)
occurs in the supposition S. It is then common to assert ϕ(τ), or more explicitly,
that according to S, ϕ(τ). Informally, we will then call ϕ a conformal property of
τ . This tracks what the Mally-inspired Platonist calls encoding . The only difference
is that we do not posit properties or a new type of relation between properties and
individuals. What Linsky and Zalta call exemplification mirrors normal predication,
and in cases of normal predication (wherein prefixing ‘according to S’ perverts the
sense of what is meant) we will call the property τ is said to have a normal prop-
erty. So, e.g., being-extremely-bulked-up is a conformal property of Superman, while
being-a-marketing-success is a normal property of Superman. Similarly, being-even
is a conformal property of both the integers p and q above, while being-used-for-the-
sake-of-reductio is a normal property.
The desiderata we introduced in § 2 apply not just to mathematical entities, but to
objects of supposition in general. There, we introduced the desiderata as though they
were independent of one another. The first, that mathematical objects should have
the conformal properties they do necessarily, is intimately related to the desideratum
of fine-grained identity. Concerning fine-grained identity, when we begin to examine
9We do not claim that the supposition is the set of sentences. Suppositions are historically
located actions involving language use. Sets of sentences are not.
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the Superman legend, we can wonder whether the Superman of comic book fame is
the same Superman as the Superman of the TV series, and again whether that is the
same Superman as the Superman of the movies. Even within these genres, we can ask
whether we have in mind a single cumulative supposition or a series of suppositions,
one per episode. THE Superman in each alternative is a distinct Superman. The
reason we get by in ordinary discourse without having to differentiate is that we
seldom drill down deep enough in conformal discourse to find any discrepancies. But
if discrepancies arise, then, to straighten things out, we are forced to recur to the
content of the separate suppositions in order to individuate in terms of conformal
properties. Thus, the conformal properties are necessary properties and the proper
theory of names for objects of supposition resembles a description theory. There is
no way to track reference other than by the conformal properties of the bearer of the
name. So ‘Superman wears a red cape’ is analytically true.
6. Mathematic Existence and Proof
Insofar as theorems and proofs play an indispensable role in mathematics, math-
ematics is steeped in supposition. The props of the mathematician are axiom sets.
The interpretive engine of mathematics closes them under logical consequence, yield-
ing suppositions otherwise known as theories. That is the global picture. More in-
tricate workings of mathematical supposition can be found under the hood of the
interpretive engine.
A common literary device is the supposition within the supposition, often in con-
scious reflection of the outer supposition. This is a matter of what is outputted by
the interpretive engine. In contrast, mathematics puts supposition to further work
inside the interpretive engine in the generation of the main supposition. This is the
role of supposition in the proof techniques of natural deduction: conditional deriva-
tion, reductio ad absurdum, separation of cases, universal derivation, and existential
instantiation. The last two, because of the need to introduce an arbitrary individ-
ual, involve an expansion of the language by a new term. The new term spawns
an object of supposition. This object of supposition does not make its way into the
theory generated. Nonetheless, from the outside, in the metalanguage, the object of
supposition survives. This is what enabled us to speak of the integers p and q from
the outside of the above reductio argument.
Only what we say in the metalanguage about the status of objects of supposition
introduced in the course of a derivation differs according to the character of the
derivation. In contrast to the above reductio argument, consider Proposition 1,
Book I of Euclid and its proof. In original form, the proposition is stated as a
construction problem: to describe an equilateral triangle upon a given finite straight
line. In indicative form, we can take the theorem to be: for any given finite straight
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line there exists an equilateral triangle having as one of its sides the finite straight
line. The standard proof begins with the strategy of universal derivation. Let AB
be a given finite straight line. According to Euclid’s postulates, there exist circles
of radius AB centered at A and B, respectively, which (and here there is a lapse)
intersect at a third point C. And so on.
Outside the proof, we can continue to speak of the endpoints A and B of the given
finite line, of the sides AC and BC of the constructed equilateral triangle ABC, and
so on. But now, here is the contrast. Outside the reductio argument, we typically
assert that p and q do not exist.10 Outside the constructive proof above, we typically
do not deny the existence of the geometric points A, B, C, the corresponding line
segments or the equilateral triangle. The general principle seems to be this. If an
object of supposition introduced in the course of a proof leads to inconsistency, then,
in the metalanguage, the existence of the object of supposition is to be denied. If
the object leads to a consistent extension, then, in the metalanguage, the existence
of the object of supposition is, ceteris paribus, not denied.11
The connection with non-trivial automorphisms is as follows. We take as our
example now a Minkowski space-time, which in the framework of manifolds with
pseudo-Riemannian metrics is a structure of the form M = (E4, η), where η is the
Minkowski metric. The automorphisms of M comprise the Poincare´ group, and
thus all points of the domain of discourse E4 are indistinguishable. Thus, according
to the Linsky-Zalta account, they are either the same or else do not exist at all.
However, in deriving theorems about Minkowski space-time, we are invariably led
in our proofs to speak of specific points P , Q, R, and so on. As long as these are
not used in reductio proofs, then we are dealing with expansions of M of the form
(E4, η, PM, QM, RM, . . .) whose symmetries will be a proper subgroup of the Poincare´
group, perhaps even the trivial group,12 since the points PM, QM, RM must be left
invariant.
Were we never to introduce constants for individual points, we might well wonder
whether the points of a homogenous space exist. This, however, is a counterfactual
nearly as outre´ as one with ‘if 6 were 9’ as antecedent. The bottom line is this.
The suppositional view, although a description of standing practice, is illuminating
10This has a parallel in talk about fictions. Outside the Superman supposition, we say (as a
matter of normal, not conformal discourse) that Superman does not exist. However, the underlying
reasons in the two cases appear to be different. In the Superman case, it is to emphasize that
Superman is merely an object of supposition.
11We would be remiss not to mention that it is a common practice in geometry texts to state
the theorems in a form that tacitly presupposes universal generalization.
12We are not hereby suggesting that the justification is that at some stage the Linksy-Zalta prin-
ciple (3) kicks in. Numerical identity in mathematics is always ultimately a matter of stipulation,
not of discovery.
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enough to explain our inclination to grant existence to the points of a homogenous
space.
7. Internal Critique of Platonized Naturalism
We have not shown that the Linsky-Zalta doctrine cannot be repaired by the
introduction of auxiliary assumptions, perhaps mirroring in ontology what we have
described as practice. There is a reason internal to their scheme, though, that leads
us to think their approach is irrescuable.
The difficulty lies in their comprehension scheme (1). Comprehension schemes in
mathematics (and axiom schemes in general) invariably appeal to conditions for-
mulated in some precisely specified language. But the Linsky-Zalta theory speaks
only of “conditions” without specifying a language. One thus has to speculate on
their intent. Clearly, they do not have in mind the language of ZF or some other
contender for a foundation of mathematics. For they explicitly want their compre-
hension scheme to generate as abstract objects such creatures of fiction as Santa
Claus and Superman. So the language must be cast rather widely. That leaves, as
far as we can discern, two possibilities. Either the language is intended to be natu-
ral language as it currently is or else some super-language of which current natural
language is but a proper sublanguage. The first alternative is not in keeping with
the spirit of their platonism, according to which abstract entities are outside space
and time. Otherwise abstract individuals will pop into existence as natural language
grows over time. This leaves the super-language alternative. But it is hard to see
what sort of super-language might be intended, whether it be something like natu-
ral language in the limit of all time, or like the union of all possible languages, or
some yet further option. We find such notions just as unworkable as appealing to
the ultimate completion of Cantor’s transfinite hierarchy (not in some formal model
but in reality). Without any input for “conditions on properties” the doctrine is
inert. Without some circumscription of the “conditions on properties” the view is
unfathomable.
8. Methodological Matters
Quite apart from this we find the Linsky-Zalta project, as well as a range of others
in analytic metaphysics, suspect on methodological grounds that can be fully appre-
ciated only with further articulation of the suppositional view. These grounds reveal
the extent to which Platonized naturalism falls short of naturalism if “naturalism”
is to mean conformity with the method of the natural sciences.
As we have intimated above, science too trades in objects of supposition.13 On the
one hand, some are for matters of convenience and are not construed by practitioners
13In addition to those of mathematics.
10 ROBERT A. RYNASIEWICZ, SHANE STEINERT-THRELKELD, VIVEK SURI
as adding ontological freight to the theories that use them. These are convenient fic-
tions that assist in modeling the phenomena, unifying treatments of various classes
of phenomena, giving explanations, or solving problems. Among these are idealiza-
tions and auxiliary quantities of a “mixed” mathematical character, e.g., frictionless
planes, incompressible fluids, image charges in electrostatics, epicycles and equants in
Ptolemaic astronomy, valencies and quantum orbitals, Fermi spheres, Hamiltonians
and Lagrangians.
On the other hand are hypothetical entities such as celestial spheres, vital pneuma,
Cartesian vortices, phlogiston, and caloric. One can readily verify that these have the
typical signatures of objects of supposition: conformal vs. normal properties, truth-
value gaps with respect to conformal properties, fine-graining of identity. In addition
to its failed hypotheticals, science also has its vindicated hypotheticals (the electron,
neutron, positron, neutrino, top quark, black holes) and its current hypotheticals
(the Higgs boson, squark, gravitino). One would then like a uniform treatment of
hypotheticals in general. This can be done given an account of discovery we call the
appropriation model .
But before outlining the model, we need to be clear on what we mean by a hy-
pothetical entity. We mean an entity introduced into scientific discourse as if it
were an empirical entity, but whose existence is hypothetical in the sense there is no
currently established empirical entity that is the referent of discourse. Accordingly,
both caloric and the Higgs boson should count as hypothetical entities. As for the
electron, neutron, and so on, we take it that presently these have the status of well-
established empirical entities, but that prior to their respective discoveries “they”
were merely hypothetical entities.
Without the scare quotes a paradox would arise. How can something that is merely
an object of supposition suddenly, through an act of discovery, become a concrete
empirical entity? Obviously, no such transmogrification transpires. The hypothetical
entity itself is not detected during the course of discovery, but rather a concrete
empirical entity whose configuration of normal properties sufficiently matches certain
of the conformal properties of the hypothetical entity in such a way as to give someone
cause to make an association between the two. There are two principal grounds
for maintaining a distinction between the hypothetical entity and its post-discovery
counterpart. First, per definition, the term or terms for the hypothetical has no
empirical referent. That what we ordinarily call hypothetical entities fit the definition
is plausible insofar as it’s hard to generate principled and credible causal accounts of
reference that don’t also entail that ‘Cartesian vortex’ refers to space-time curvature
or ‘caloric’ to kinetic energy. The second is the modal contrast that arises given that
conformal properties are had necessarily whereas normal properties (for the most
part) only contingently. This can be seen in particular in the case of the neutron.
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The term was coined by William Sutherland 1899, 273: “If electrons are distributed
through the aether, we must suppose that in aether showing no electric charge each
negative electron is united with a positive electron to form the analogue of a material
molecule, which might conveniently be called a neutron.” This hypothetical neutron
never took off, but in the early 1920s a revamped neutron appeared in the theoretical
work of both Rutherford (1920) and Harkins (1921) on the constitution of atomic
nuclei. As initially, the core feature of the revived neutron was that it is a composite
particle, consisting of an electron and a proton in a tightly bound state. Even in
Chadwick (1932), the paper which is popularly regarded as the announcement of
the discovery of the neutron, he writes “We may suppose it to consist of a proton
and an electron in close combination, the ‘neutron’ discussed by Rutherford . . . .”
(697) Otherwise, he could not have identified it as the so-called neutron. An oth-
erwise constituted (or elementary) particle would not have been the neutron. With
Chadwick, however, the term ‘neutron’ came to denote the constituent particles of
a particular type of beam of radiation emitted by beryllium. Within a few months
it was possible for D. Iwanenko to muse whether “the neutrons can be considered as
elementary particles,” (Iwanenko 1932, 798) a view championed by Blackett shortly
thereafter in order to make sense out of quantum spin and statistics.
To the extent that the appropriation model of discovery is on target, theories trad-
ing in hypothetical entities are not even candidates to be true or false. Nonetheless,
they can be evaluated according to whether or not they are vindicated , i.e., whether
the hypotheticals they speak of are eventually “discovered” or instead discarded. If
a hypothetical, according to the theory itself, is in principle barred from empiri-
cal detection as one of its conformal properties, the hypothetical becomes hopeless .
An example is the version of Lorentz’s stationary ether theory that conforms to
Poincare´’s (limited) Principle of Relativity, viz., that there is no way to detect the
motion of a physical system through the ether. One might ask why we should pre-
fer special relativity rather than believing that there is a preferred stationary ether
frame even though we will never know which initial frame it is. You might invoke
Ockam’s razor, but that won’t help unless you have a brief that nature must be
simple. The suppositional view (with the appropriation model) yields an immediate
reason for preferring special relativity.
We now find the Linsky-Zalta view on the horns of a dilemma. Either their Pla-
tonism is a daring one according to which the postulation of mathematical entities is
a bold move on a par with advocating hypothetical entities in the natural sciences;
or else it is a timid one according to which the postulation of mathematical entities
is no more ontologically daring than the use of auxiliary constructs in the natural
sciences. If it is daring, then mathematical entities are hopeless — there is no ana-
logue for the role of discovery. On the other hand, if it is timid, then its ontological
commitments are no deeper than the deflationary ontology of the suppositional view
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and, frankly, there is no need for a postulational approach. In short, even if some
of the consequences of their view appear to be on target, it in no way follows that
we should take their metaphysical assumptions seriously. In contrast, we would like
to say that these consequences should be taken seriously because they are induc-
tively warranted from an examination of the empirical features of language use in
mathematical practice.
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